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Thirty States of Renewability: Controversial energies and the politics of 
incumbent industry 
Ingrid Behrsin, Sarah Knuth and Anthony Levenda 




Renewable energy advocates have positioned a wide array of technologically novel energy 
sources as fossil fuel alternatives. These efforts to usher in renewable energy transitions have 
long been shaped by definitional contestations. Political ecological scholarship tells us that such 
definitions are meaningful. Indeed, labeling energy sources as renewable has become a power-
laden act, which may spark innovation, yet simultaneously create openings for problematic 
classifications and unjust socio-ecological relations. However, we still know too little about how 
such classification politics are taking shape within green industrial policy formation; particularly, 
how they encounter incumbent industries and industrial regions. In this paper, we argue that 
these theoretical questions are crucial for an emerging industrial political ecology, and explore 
three recent developments in the US context. A country that has notoriously avoided open and 
coordinated national industrial policy, the United States has approached the renewable energy 
economy in a similarly geographically-fragmented fashion. We highlight a central yet under-
examined tool in US energy-industrial policy: the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). Mandated 
by thirty states, RPSs are the US’s central mechanism for renewable energy procurement—yet 
RPSs diverge substantially from state to state in terms of the energy sources they classify and 
incentivize as renewable. We argue that industrial interests and state governments have together 
capitalized upon RPSs’ malleability to support regionally significant sectors, including “dirty” 
industries and industrial wastes. These industries, often controversially, thereby position 
themselves for rebranding and new forms of value capture. 
Highlights 
1. US state governments are supporting regionally significant, yet controversial incumbent 
industrial sectors through Renewable Portfolio Standard policies.  
2. Regionally significant industries are engaging in processes of rebranding and new value 
capture in response to opportunities and threats posed by climate change. 
3. US Renewable Portfolio Standards are sites of definitional struggles over classifications 
of renewable energy sources, including novel waste-to-energy proposals. 
4. Industrial political ecology provides important insights into the transformative 
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From renewable energy’s early days in the 1970s Energy Crisis to its ongoing boom today, 
novelty has lent a significant technological and definitional openness to the sector. Multiple 
generation sources contribute to renewable energy portfolios (Hirsh, 2001). Political ecological 
scholarship increasingly tells us that labels like “renewable” hold meaning (Behrsin, 2019b). 
Indeed, classifying energy resources as renewable has become a politically significant act, 
creating openings for problematic classifications and unjust socio-ecological relations. Attention 
to definitional battles around renewables joins a wave of recent political ecology research on 
renewables highlighting how uncritical equation of renewables with environmental benefits and 
justice can facilitate perverse outcomes (Levenda et al., 2021). For example, political ecologists 
have particularly noted the land-extensive nature of many rising renewable energy forms (Huber 
and McCarthy, 2017), and warned of new “green” land grabbing (Fairhead et al., 2012), social 
marginalization (Baka, 2014), and ecological harm (Mulvaney, 2019).  
Yet as Bridge (2018) has recently argued, social-scientific energy research’s preoccupation with 
rising energy technologies has obscured an equally crucial face of today’s energy transition: the 
question of incumbent industry, and in particular its strategies and future in a prospective 
renewable energy economy. Existing analyses of incumbency frequently focus on the compelled 
or (dubiously) self-managed “disassembly” (Bridge, 2018) of emissions-intensive industries and 
infrastructures facing “transition risk” (Christophers, 2017), from fossil fuels to other carbon-
intensive sectors such as heavy industry and food production (Bridge and Gailing, 2020; Knuth, 
2017). Others underline the power that incumbent fossil fuel industries maintain to resist and 
delay energy transition in the United States (Stokes, 2020) and other legacy production regions 
(Kuchler and Bridge, 2018). 
In this paper, we emphasize another strategy: incumbent-industrial bids to use the renewable 
energy economy to capture new forms of value and/or as an opportunity for rebranding. These 
attempts frequently provoke charges of industry “greenwashing”—and may well deserve the 
critique. Nonetheless, we argue that they require deeper scrutiny within analyses of renewable 
energy transition. Though trends like new fossil fuel sector investment in mainstream renewables 
(e.g., offshore wind projects) demand investigation, we highlight another face of these efforts: 
incumbent industries’ power to redefine other energy sources—to “render [them] renewable” 
(Behrsin, 2019b)—in their favor. Such efforts underline the politics of renewable energy 
classification, and how incumbent industries may shape them and their power within complex, 
regional trajectories of novelty, obduracy, and path-dependence. Particularly, we consider here 
three industrial waste byproducts that have been classified and incentivized as renewable energy 
resources within recent US energy-industrial policy, and the significance of these classifications 
for the differentiated array of “dirty”, carbon-intensive1 incumbent industries that generate them. 
Through this exploration, we address an important gap in existing scholarship: we still know too 
little about how renewable energy’s classification politics are taking shape within green 
 
1 Adopting a common shorthand, though methane and nitrous oxide are more significant greenhouse gases than 
carbon dioxide for some processes considered here. 
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industrial policy formation; particularly, these thorny questions of how they encounter incumbent 
industries and industrial regions.  
The United States (US) has approached the renewable energy economy much as it has national 
industrial policy: in a geographically fragmented, piecemeal fashion. In place of coordinated 
national policy, US states have instead led the country’s renewable energy transition (Rabe, 
2006). This paper examines the role of incumbent industry in shaping renewable portfolio 
standards (RPSs), central yet under-examined tools in state energy-industrial policy. RPS 
policies require certain electricity providers to provision specified amounts of renewable energy 
over a particular period of time. Used as binding policies by thirty US states, RPSs are a central 
mechanism for the country’s renewable energy procurement (Barbose, 2019). Crucially, RPSs 
also stipulate, with considerable freedom, what types of energy resources are eligible as 
“renewable.” We argue that US state governments are supporting regionally significant, yet 
controversial incumbent industrial sectors through RPS policies’ classificatory malleability. We 
briefly illustrate our analytical argument via three recent “waste-to-energy” cases: in 
Pennsylvania (waste coal from mining), Oregon (biomass waste from logging and industrial 
forestry), and North Carolina (animal waste from industrial-scale livestock). Each case highlights 
projects to redefine and revalue waste byproducts by focusing on how classifications of, and 
incentivization structures for, renewable energy resources have been conditioned by industries 
with particularly strong footholds in the states in which they are based.  
Analytically, we highlight the usefulness of an emerging “industrial” political ecology (Huber, 
2017). We suggest that the subfield may usefully look to political ecology’s long history with/in 
geographical political economy for important tools for regional industrial and industrial-political 
analysis. Moreover, taking industrial incumbency seriously is crucial to industrial political 
ecological work on a just transition given the multi-sided costs of both deindustrialization and 
redevelopment. In discussing the cases surveyed here, we will argue that this combined 
inheritance gives industrial political ecology important analytics for diagnosing greenwashing 
and forms of environmental destruction and injustice emerging within or perpetuated by 
incumbents’ (re)definitional projects. Frequently, these amplify deeper injustices of racial 
capitalism. We also suggest that projects of redefining/revaluing industrial wastes and “dirty” 
sectors may offer important windows into more elusive, if never guaranteed, possibilities of 
genuine techno-organizational redefinition, qualitatively novel forms of value capture within 
existing industries, and reassembly. 
 
Theorizing an Industrial Political Ecology of Renewable Energy 
 
The Industrial Politics of Energy Transition: How Do Incumbents Face Renewables?  
 
Notwithstanding political ecology’s aforementioned inroads into critiquing renewables as a 
driver of land contestation, we argue that fully taking on renewable energy in its diverse 
realizations—including how it might and might not be classified as environmentally beneficial or 
just—requires asking additional kinds of questions, and engaging the field’s more plural 
traditions. Notably, political ecology requires more sustained engagement with renewable energy 
industries as industries that take shape in and through familiar industrial-geographical dynamics 
and prompt durable environmental degradation and (in)justice questions: on the factory floor, in 
waste byproducts and environmental harms, and within globalized supply chains and extractive 
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geographies of materials sourcing. In this intervention, we echo Baka and Vaishnava 
(Forthcoming), and particularly Mulvaney (2014, 2019) and Bridge and Gailing (2020). More 
broadly, we join other recent arguments for “industrializing” political ecology (Barca and 
Bridge, 2015; Huber, 2017; Newell et al., 2017). Though these calls root themselves in distinct 
scholarly conversations and propose non-identical programs of research, we suggest that all are 
useful in illuminating under-examined questions in the renewable energy economy. Departing 
somewhat from their takes, we simultaneously underline political ecology’s existing toolkit for 
interrogating industrial processes, an inheritance of its longer legacies with/in geographic 
political economy (McCarthy, 2012). We suggest that this combined tradition gives us many 
tools for scrutinizing industrial formations, including renewables, particularly in their regional(-
political) embeddedness. 
 
We apply these tools to a largely unconsidered facet of renewables development today: the 
entrance of a range of firms and industrial sectors frequently considered “dirty” and 
environmentally controversial into the renewable energy space. Bridge (2018, page 17, emphasis 
added) has recently argued that “to an extraordinary degree…[social scientific work on energy 
transition] has focussed on innovation and the diffusion of new socio-technical configurations 
over time and space.” He maintains that this preoccupation with technological novelty and 
emergence has meant a problematic under-attention to questions of incumbency. Incumbent 
strategies, he argues, may take many forms. Bridge considers how such sectors might resist the 
potential destabilization of structural shifts to renewables and a low-carbon economy via either 
‘last-gasp’ incumbent innovation or “defensive political moves to limit or resist further systemic 
change” (p. 18). This picture of interest group lobbying to resist outright and politically exclude 
a broad class of technological rivals is realized in Stokes’ (2020) picture of US fossil fuel 
industries’ “organized combat” against renewable energy challengers, often waged through RPS 
standard-setting and rollback processes. Kuchler and Bridge (2018) present another facet of this 
political resistance in policymakers’ efforts to rehabilitate socio-technical imaginaries of coal 
and coal’s future in Poland.  
 
However, we suggest that the suite of strategic responses that scholars like Bridge (2018) raise as 
possibilities for incumbent industries facing energy transition remains somewhat restrictive. We 
maintain that these moves, while undoubtedly important, fail to encompass the full range of 
strategies that “dirty” incumbent industries and/or supportive political institutions are currently 
deploying in response to the rise of renewable energy as a sector. The mobilizations around 
incumbent industries that we explore in this article’s three cases are more challenging to interpret 
(particularly in real time), and we will argue they do not fit comfortably within either of Bridge’s 
categories. This is perhaps particularly true because we examine several industries that are new 
entrants into the modern renewable energy sector: timber and livestock agro-industry. Both 
industries are, like coal, carbon-intensive and embattled on other environmental questions, 
including racialized environmental injustice. Despite these critiques, these incumbents have 
couched their entry into renewable energy generation in terms of endogenous technological 
novelty and fresh value capture opportunities: an ability to generate solutions from within, 






Waste to Renewable Energy Source? The Politics of (Re)Classification 
 
In advancing a more expansive and hybrid lens into incumbent-industrial relations with/in the 
emerging renewable energy economy, we build particularly on recent scholarship that questions 
the role of knowledge claims in constituting and incentivizing contested energy resources as 
renewable (Behrsin, 2019b, 2019a; Palmer, 2020). Previously examined energy resources 
include municipal solid waste included as part of European biomass schemes (Behrsin, 2019b) 
and in Maryland’s RPS (Behrsin, 2019a), as well as forest biomass pellets being produced by the 
US Southern timber industry and exported for European electricity generation (Palmer, 2020; see 
also Carton, 2016). In a different mode, Knuth (2019) explores how energy efficiency retrofitting 
practices reclassify and revalue energy “waste” in degraded buildings, and increasingly harness 
such reclassifications to growing real estate asset values.  
 
This research presented here identifies additional controversial energy resources and dirty parent 
industries now being “rendered renewable” (Behrsin, 2019b), and the processes through which 
such classifications are constructed and put to work. It advances a broader critical scholarship 
questioning how waste in various forms is made valuable/rendered a resource(Gidwani and 
Reddy, 2011; Knapp, 2016; Moore, 2008). Much geographic literature on waste focuses on 
global commodity chains and global production networks to illustrate how value is produced via 
material capture, material processing (both taking things apart and putting them together), and 
the distribution and sale of various materials derived from wastes (Gregson and Crang, 2010; 
Lepawsky and Billah, 2011). Schinlder and Demaria (2019, page 9) argue that this search for 
surplus value constructs waste as a commodity frontier where 
various modes of valorization grant opportunities for value to be created (i.e. 
through labor), enhanced (i.e. through a new technology, method or organizational 
structure) and captured by powerful strategically-situated actors. 
They also note important political ecological effects of different modes of valorization: in their 
concept of a socio-metabolic reconfiguration, competition and reconfiguration of actors “often 
results in ecological distribution conflicts over value creation, enhancement and capture” (2019, 
page 6). Millington and Lawhon (2019, page 1054) contribute that the contingency of supply 
chains and the materialities of waste are central to the creation of value (or not), as “many waste 
materials...have very little economic value unless conditions can be rendered right” (emphasis 
added). For waste to attain capitalist value, then, requires a particular set of conditions that do 
not exist apriori, but are (re)assembled in projects of accumulation. Among these conditions, we 
argue, are the intersecting energy classification schemes in which materials deemed “wastes” are 
embedded. 
 
These contributions point to the essentially political nature of the classifications examined in this 
article. Our exploration advances political ecology’s broader questioning of classification, 
measurement, and how such processes characterize the state’s role in resource-making (Bridge, 
2014; Robertson and Wainwright, 2013). As Cooper (2015) has argued, this “metrological” 
theorizing has often centralized tools like standards and processes such as valuation, 
commodification, and commensuration necessary for making novel markets, but its analytical 
purchase does not end there. Indeed, existing research on the intersection of waste and 
renewables classification has begun to scrutinize energy policy instruments as power-laden sites 
for both market-making, as in the case of the European Union Renewable Energy Directive’s 
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treatment of waste incineration (Behrsin, 2019b), and broader redefinitional projects: for 
example, waste’s shifting representations as dirty environmental justice villain, climate solution, 
and commodity as reflected in Maryland’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (Behrsin, 2019a) and 
the European Union (Behrsin and De Rosa, 2020). As we consider other examples, we draw on 
under-utilized contributions from critical industrial geography that examine how industrial 
wastes have been recaptured to generate qualitatively novel products and sectors (Romero, 2015, 
2016; Walker, 2016). 
 
Important insights also come from redefinitional politics of energy envisioned through racial 
justice movements (Lennon, 2017), amid broader critiques of the definitional exclusions 
necessary to the reproduction of racial capitalism (Melamed, 2015; Pulido, 2016b, 2016a)—
including its imagined ‘low-carbon’ futures (Bigger and Millington, 2020). Of particular 
importance is the growing understanding of the failure of the state to deliver environmental 
justice through regulation or other mechanisms of accountability (Pellow, 2016; Pulido et al., 
2016). In the context of just transition activism and policy, we are likely to see more 
environmental justice activists engage in strategies beyond or against the state, especially as 
struggles for energy transition are more deeply connected to racial justice and Indigenous 
resistance (Estes, 2019; Gilio-Whitaker, 2019). Struggles over rendering energy sources 
renewable in state RPSs are thus less likely to embody EJ principles unless significant pressure is 
placed on legislators, who are often tied directly to industry through campaign contributions and 
lobbying (Stokes, 2020). 
 
Industrial Policy for Renewables? Regionalizing Incumbency 
 
Finally, there is still little research that addresses how renewables (re)classification politics are 
taking shape within broader industrial policy formation, and its differentiated geographies. 
Tackling this question is particularly imperative as renewable energy becomes a central target for 
developmental state policies and programs, economic stimulus packages, and other industrial 
politics (e.g. Mulvaney, 2019; Spivey, 2020). As Bridge and Gailing (2020) have compellingly 
argued, “pathways to decarbonization are conditioned by existing geographies (in relation to 
legacies of investment in infrastructure, for example),” and state programs and policies 
increasingly select energy sources/technologies that advance other regional economic goals such 
as securing technological rents (Knuth, 2018). However, we need to know more about what 
specific instruments are being enlisted in, or created for, these emerging green industrial policies. 
We argue here that tools like RPSs, historically framed in terms of advancing governmental 
energy and climate commitments, are increasingly functioning as industrial policy. As Stokes 
(2020) similarly argues, US state-level RPSs prospectively create prospective forms of path-
dependence for novel technologies and industries, though also delineate political terrain for 
incumbents to target, in her analysis framed chiefly in terms of combat rather than the more 
ambiguous (re)definitional efforts considered here. 
 
The regional scaling and potential regional particularism of state-level RPSs as industrial policy 
speak to important theoretical traditions within political economy and economic geography. 
While scholars have certainly questioned national industrial policies, both official and ‘hidden’ 
(Block and Keller, 2011; Mazzucato, 2015) the industrial region has formed a central unit of 
geographic analysis (Massey, 1995; Pike, 2020; Storper and Walker, 1989; and see Bridge and 
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Gailing, 2020). This body of research covers diverse strategies and policy mechanisms through 
which regional governments have both fostered industrial agglomerations, regional value 
capture/rents, and distinctive trajectories of techno-organizational development, as well as been 
shaped themselves institutionally in the process. Here again, however, we encounter similar 
preoccupations with novelty as Bridge (2018) critiques: in centralizing the imperative to develop 
a more critical and relational industrial location theory, analytics such as ‘geographic 
industrialization’ (Storper and Walker, 1989) likewise privilege new sectors and/in the 
emergence of industrial regions.  
 
To locate relevant precedents for analyzing diverse incumbent industries and industrial regions, 
and how their firms and embedded political institutions are responding to the potential structural 
shift of a low-carbon economy, we must look equally to political economic scholarship on long-
term continuity and change in industrial regions (Massey, 1995). Geographical political economy 
continues to debate regional futures of deindustrialization and prospective reinvention; as Pike 
(2020, page 2) argues, “torn between the seemingly irreversible structural shifts in economies 
suggested by Hall’s (1985) interpretation that ‘tomorrow’s industries are not going to be born in 
yesterday’s regions’ and Krugman’s (2005, p. 1) more optimistic identification of the potential 
for ‘second winds for industrial regions’.” In the United States, regions have chronically built 
deeply racialized injustice into such projects of industrial redevelopment and novel value 
capture—underlining the potential for such “reinventions” to work in more fundamentally 
regressive ways (e.g. Gilmore, 2007). 
We suggest that the combined industrial political ecological framework we develop here—
articulating analysis of dovetailed renewable energy and waste (re)classification projects with 
more situated insights from geographical political economy—can help us better understand how 
incumbent industries and regions are facing the green industrial economy. This coupled approach 
can unearth forces that motivate industries and regional policy-makers to claim waste as a 
renewable energy resource and new source of value, as well as highlight the diverse advantages 
that state-supported labels and legitimation may convey: new market opportunities, state 
funding, regulatory support, environmental review expediency, and beyond. US RPSs, discussed 
in the following section, are policy instruments that proffer many of these opportunities. 
 
US Renewable Portfolio Standards: From Energy to Industrial Policy 
 
Though the United States subsidizes the development of a range of renewable energy forms at 
the federal level, RPSs are the country’s central governmental mechanism for renewable energy 
procurement. As with much else in US federalism, state governments have led the way in setting 
these more directive policies; the United States has no unified national mandate. State RPS 
policies require electricity providers such as investor-owned utilities to provide specified 
amounts of electricity from governmentally-determined renewable energy sources over a 
particular period of time. Thirty states, plus the District of Columbia, have at the time of writing 
passed mandatory RPS requirements; an additional seven have less-stringent renewable energy 
‘goals’ (Bandyk, 2020; DSIRE, 2016). US national lab analysis suggests that approximately half 
of the country’s growth in renewable energy generation and capacity since 2000 can be attributed 




Iowa was the first state to adopt this type of policy, doing so in 1983, in the immediate wake of 
the 1970s Energy Crisis. Officially termed an “alternate energy production requirement,” Iowa’s 
RPS policy reflected the state’s identification of economic development opportunities when 
energy demand and the cost of constructing new traditional energy facilities were high (Carley 
and Miller, 2012, page 732; Lyon and Yin, 2010). The bulk of new RPS policies were 
implemented between 2000 and 2009, when nineteen states enacted them (Barbose, 2019). 
Virginia, which passed a non-binding renewable energy policy in 2007, became in April 2020 
the most recent state to adopt a RPS requirement (Bandyk, 2020; Mercure, 2020). However, 
because RPSs are implemented by individual states, they vary widely —for example, in what 
they are termed. Research institutes and organizations that have conducted in-depth, longitudinal 
research on RPSs (e.g. the North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center’s Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE) and the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory’s Electricity Markets and Policy Group) collectively label the policies RPSs. 
However, the policies examined in this article, for example, are named by their respective states: 
Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard (Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 2017), 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (Oregon Department of Energy), and Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (North Carolina Utilities Commission). 
 
Significant axes along which RPS policies vary include geographic sourcing requirements (the 
extent to which renewable energy must be generated in-state), and exemptions for particular 
types of energy producers (Carley and Miller, 2012). In addition, there is great variation in the 
types of sources that states classify as eligible for meeting RPS requirements [See Figure 1]. 
Berry and Jaccard (2001, page 265) argue that the variation among states in terms of eligible 
sources depends “in part upon the objectives of the RPS and the local viability of different types 
of resources.” Building on this argument, we suggest that RPSs are being tailored to advance 
region-specific political economic and industrial interests. RPS policy designs also differ in that 
some incentivize particular energy sources. A ‘tiered’ RPS, for example, groups fuel types by 
priority, and assigns a percentage obligation for each tier. Essentially, a first tier grouping would 
incentivize more desirable resource types (often solar and wind), and lower tiers would contain 
less desirable fuel types (Forte et al., 2017). Some states also employ a ‘carve-out’, or ‘set-aside’ 
strategy to encourage particular energy sectors. These procurement sub-mandates require a 
certain percentage of the RPS target to be met through specified energy sources. Gaul and Carley 
(2012) argue that carve-outs are intended to attract investors to specific industries in particular 
states, and to create favorable market conditions for these industries. Yet, again, the specific 
energy sources prioritized in these incentives vary from state to state.   
 
The purpose(s) of RPS policies have largely been articulated in terms of furthering states’ 
climate and environmental commitments, or as an energy security policy to cushion state energy 
systems against fossil fuel price volatility (Berry and Jaccard, 2001; Carley and Miller, 2012). 
However, state governments have also long envisioned RPSs as potential economic development 
policies, as Iowa’s early example suggests. Rabe (2004, 2006) argues that many RPS policies 
discursively emphasize economic benefits, sometimes over environmental ones. Similarly, 
Stokes (2020) argues that RPSs are sometimes enacted specifically to germinate industrial 
strongholds in their states. More particular economic development advantages touted in RPS 
policies include job creation, direct investment from facility construction and operation, tax 
revenues, indirect and induced economic impacts that result from the purchase of goods and 
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services (Barbose et al., 2015), and new opportunities for local technological expertise to take 
hold (Berry and Jaccard, 2001). Indeed, Jones et al. (2015, page 3) suggest that California’s RPS, 
initially passed in 2002, had by the mid-2010s generated 130,00 direct and indirect jobs; they 
project that raising the standard to 50% by 2030 would create a total of 879,000 to 1,067,000 
jobs. 
 
As renewable energy resources and technologies become central targets for industrial policy, 
RPSs’ economic power is increasingly significant, practically and analytically. Because the 
United States lacks a unified national energy policy, US states have been for all intents and 
purposes leading green industrial policy formation. We must therefore question the distinctive 
attributes and potential significance of this regionalism. We suggest that RPSs have acquired a 
particular power in the US’s decentralized and uneven setting, which may in a more sympathetic 
light be interpreted as a conducive environment for regional experiments in climate and green 
industrial governance—what Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013) call, after Louis Brandeis, 
‘laboratories of democracy’. Notably, RPSs provide state-level policymakers a flexible site for 
individuating particular renewable energy forms, unevenly incentivizing them, and imposing 




































2 n.b. This data is through October 2019. It therefore does not include the technologies included in the Virginia RPS, 
which was passed in April 2020. 
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Uses or Abuses of RPS Classification? Three Controversial Renewables Cases 
A set of brief cases highlights a more particular economic power of state RPSs, specifically how 
their capacity to classify and incentivize renewable energy forms may be sculpted to benefit 
incumbent regional industries. Though this lens might turn up many examples that warrant 
scholarly attention, again we focus here on notably controversial renewable energies and parent 
industries. The vignettes outline the specific environmental and industrial histories of regions in 
which these contested energy resources have emerged, and the institutions and political actors 
that drive their renewable classification. Two cases, Pennsylvania and North Carolina, scrutinize 
renewable energy resources that are rare among state RPS policies, the former RPS in its 
resource inclusion (waste coal) and the latter via an unusual set-aside incentive (for animal 
waste). The Oregon case suggests that biomass, included to some extent in all thirty state RPSs 
(Figure 1), has been more particularly made meaningful and incentivized in conjunction with the 
refashioning of Oregon’s timber industry.  
 
Coal Waste in Pennsylvania’s Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard 
 
Pennsylvania’s RPS (Pennsylvania Act 213 of 2004) was signed into legislation by then-
Governor Ed Rendell. While it resembles other states’ policies in many ways, Act 213 is unique 
among state RPSs in that it includes waste coal as an eligible fuel source. With Colorado, it is 
one of only two states to explicitly include a coal-based fuel in its RPS (DSIRE, 2015, 2018). 
Pennsylvania’s RPS stipulates an 18% alternative energy target by the year 2021, which the state 
is set to meet (McDevitt, 2020). It is structured around two tiers, as well as a 0.5% carve-out for 
solar photovoltaics. Methane from abandoned coal mines is classified as a tier I renewable, 
whereas coal waste is classified as a tier II fuel.  
Pennsylvania is the country’s third largest coal producer, behind only Wyoming and West 
Virginia. In 2018, the state’s 151 mines produced nearly 50 million short tons of coal, both 
bituminous and anthracite; Pennsylvania produces more coal than any other of the 30 states with 
RPSs in place (US Energy Information Administration, 2018). Pennsylvania’s coal industry has 
declined dramatically in the 17 years since the RPS was passed, most directly due to the rise of 
cheap natural gas (Rhys and Garner, 2020). However, the RPS preserves an ongoing value 
capture opportunity via the industry’s wasteful legacies, notably in the form of waste coal. Waste 
coal, also colloquially termed “culm”, “gob”, or “boney,” is a discarded byproduct of the 
commercial coal mining process. It refers to low-energy matter, often combined with other inert 
minerals, that is mechanically sorted out from the more energy-rich anthracite or bituminous 
coal. In Pennsylvania, waste coal piles cover an aggregate area of 8,500 acres, or about two 
billion cubic yards, according to the anthracite industry interest group ARIPPA, split equally 
between the anthracite and bituminous coal regions (The Coal Refuse Dilemma: Burning Coal 
for Environmental Benefits, 2016). The piles “resemble barren and dark mountains” (Glenna and 
Thomas, 2010, page 859). Pennsylvania is home to 15 of the 19 US power facilities that burn 
waste coal as their primary fuel. Together, Pennsylvania waste coal facilities burn more than 13 
billion pounds of waste coal annually (Food and Water Watch, 2018), contributing five percent 
of the state’s electricity generation (Legere, 2015).  
Coal refuse deposits garner concern from a wide array of actors. Because the piles are volatile 
and can spontaneously combust or be ignited by lightning or people (McNay, 1971), among top 
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concerns is the risk of fire and associated toxic air pollution. In 2014, for example, a seven-acre 
coal refuse site near Simpson, PA burned for several months (The Associated Press, 2014). Coal 
refuse piles also pollute waterways by leaching iron, manganese, aluminum, and acid drainage 
(Energy Justice Network, n.d.). However, there are long-standing tensions between those who 
favor leaving the deposits in place and adopting a landscape remediation approach, and those 
who believe the best approach to addressing the risks associated with waste coal deposits is to 
harness it for energy. According to ARIPPA (2015) “if coal refuse from these sites is used as 
fuel… all of the problems associated with coal refuse piles are permanently addressed.” 
Environmental and energy justice advocates on the other hand, including ActionPA, Citizen 
Power, Pennsylvania Environmental Network, Student Environmental Action Coalition, Green 
Part of Pennsylvania, Sierra Club-Pennsylvania Chapter, PennEnvironment, State PIRGs, and the 
Clean Air Council (Skinner and Brown, 2011), argued that burning waste coal is even more toxic 
than traditional coal sources, especially in terms of mercury emissions, and that remediating coal 
refuse deposits through methods such as planting beach grass are highly effective and cost-
efficient (Energy Justice Network, n.d.). 
As reported in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, representatives from the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection have sided with energy industry executives in claiming that “there is a 
special place” for waste coal in the state’s energy makeup (Legere, 2015). Glenna and Thomas’ 
(2010) examination of the policy-making process that led to coal waste’s inclusion in the state’s 
renewable energy portfolio highlights the governance and legitimacy tensions that ultimately 
informed the state’s decision to include waste coal in its RPS. The authors make clear that 
Pennsylvania’s resource dependency on the coal industry informed the state’s decision. 
Specifically, according to a representative who served in the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection at the time the RPS was being debated and who the authors 
interviewed for their study, policymakers decided to include waste coal in the RPS policy in 
order to mitigate the “coal lobby’s opposition” to the policy (Glenna and Thomas, 2010, page 
861).  
For their part, coal waste energy producers’ argument for inclusion in the RPS rested on their 
assertion that while burning coal waste for electricity production provided broad economic and 
environmental benefits, waste coal’s low energy efficiency made the industry uncompetitive 
without additional incentives. Including coal waste in the RPS, therefore, would bolster this fuel 
source by creating demand for energy generated from waste coal (Glenna and Thomas, 2010). As 
explained by Skinner and Brown (2011, page 238), the alternative energy credits awarded to coal 
waste facilities through the RPS “provide a source of additional revenue that can help provide 
long term financing for qualifying facilities.” In sum, including waste coal as an eligible energy 
source in the state’s RPS reflects the coal industry’s influence on Pennsylvania renewable energy 
policy development, and the enduring tail of that influence in a changing energy system.  
Forest Debris in Oregon’s Renewable Portfolio Standard  
 
Three years after the Oregon state legislature passed the Oregon Renewable Energy Act (Senate 
Bill 838) establishing the state’s RPS, the editorial board of The Oregonian editorial board 
published a strong commentary on biomass energy’s place in the RPS: Oregon’s “forest debris as 
gold” (2010). This editorial was fueled by an imminent decision before the US Environmental 
Protection Agency concerning whether biomass should be regulated with the same carbon 
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restrictions as coal, or be classified as a renewable source of energy (Zeller, 2010). These 
classification politics emerged in the context of Oregon’s history of friction between loggers and 
environmentalists, and the contested science of biomass’s carbon neutrality.  
Logging has been a central feature of Oregon’s economy since the early 1900s (Robbins, 2006). 
After World War II, the housing construction boom cemented Oregon’s timber industry's 
national significance and yielded steady employment in places like Coos Bay, deemed the 
“Lumber Capital of the World” (Robbins, 2006). Federal lands in Oregon also became 
increasingly important to the timber industry during the 1950s and 60s as private lands were 
diminished by clearcutting practices (Rajala, 1998). During the 1990s, however, logging 
reductions on federal forest lands were put in place to protect sensitive habitats for the newly 
endangered Northern Spotted Owl (Buursma, 1989). Within five years, Oregon’s timber 
production dropped by nearly half, with logging on federal lands down by 90% (Barnum et al., 
2010). Smaller towns and rural communities across Oregon were severely impacted by the 
industrial decline and job loss (Freudenburg et al., 1998; Robbins, 2019). Protests highlighted by 
national media brought attention to a “holy war over the use of public lands” (Buursma, 1989). 
The discourse of environmentalism versus labor in Oregon, critiqued by political ecologists 
(Prudham, 2005), persisted through efforts by the Trump Administration to reduce the power of 
the Endangered Species Act in a push to revive logging industries (Bull, 2020; Loomis, 2019). 
This context of forest industry decline has shaped the carbon politics of biomass and its inclusion 
in the state’s RPS. The state’s policy allows electricity generated from biomass—material from 
hardwood timber harvested on private, managed timberlands (whole trees)—or biomass 
byproducts such as spent pulping liquor (“black liquor” resulting from converting wood into 
wood pulp) and woody debris from harvesting or thinning “to improve forest or rangeland 
ecological health and to reduce uncharacteristic stand replacing wildfire risk” (Avakian, 2007, 
page 3). Despite widespread concerns about the negative environmental implications of biomass 
for greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution (Hudiburg et al., 2011; Johnson, 2009; 
Miles and Miles, 1992), industry activists, community organizations, and government 
representatives have advocated for biomass to be viewed not only as a renewable fuel source, but 
also a carbon-neutral source of energy. Indeed, the politics of carbon emissions have figured 
centrally in debates over biomass energy, especially in the proposed biomass conversion of 
Oregon’s only remaining coal power plant (Flatt, 2019). Additionally, forest ecology, type of 
woody biomass, processing, and temporalities of carbon storage/sequestration in trees vary life-
cycle carbon emissions (Creutzig et al., 2015; Lamers and Junginger, 2013; Luyssaert et al., 
2008; Röder et al., 2015; Zanchi et al., 2012). This uncertainty at the science-policy interface can 
be exploited by different groups and shape the types of biomass included in states’ RPSs, even 
though they may increase net carbon emissions (Zeller-Powell, 2011).   
These carbon and classification politics led Oregon’s legislators to mobilize in 2010 for a three-
year exemption from Clean Air Act regulations; specifically, rules regarding how carbon 
emissions are treated in permits for new biomass fired units.3 The exemption was treated as a 
win for Oregon’s forestry industry and further motivation for expanding biomass energy 
 
3 Then EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, said in a letter to Senator Merkley that this CAA exemption would be an 




projects. As Senator Merkley explained: “Oregon is poised to grow into a world leader in 
biomass energy production. Today’s decision marks a victory for rural Oregon, timber 
communities, and the future of the industry in our state” (Merkley, 2011). Recent updates to 
Oregon’s RPS have refocused efforts on small-scale biomass, with a carve-out requirement 
created in 2016 for at least 8% of aggregate electrical capacity from community renewable 
energy projects and combined heat and power facilities using biomass (Senate Bill 1547). In 
2018, amid the ongoing carbon controversy and new limits on large biomass generation inclusion 
in the community renewable carve-out,4 the EPA declared biomass electricity generation plants 
carbon neutral, sparking a new set of concerns among scientists and environmental justice 
activists (Moomaw, 2018). 
Debates over the definition of biomass as renewable and low-carbon intersect with ongoing 
environmental justice concerns in Oregon. Battles over the permitting of biomass facilities across 
the state cited the health impacts these generation facilities have on local communities, and 
argued that the facilities were a net negative for climate change (Arkin, 2010; Arkin et al., 2012; 
Chirillo). Environmental advocates more broadly position biomass against other sources of 
renewable electricity generation to show alternatives are less carbon intensive, exposing a  
“biomass loophole” in states’ RPSs (Fairley, 2012). As evidenced by recent work on the uneven 
distribution of environmental impacts of biomass facilities (Koester and Davis, 2018; 
Mittlefehldt, 2018; Mittlefehldt and Tedford, 2014), it is likely that these racialized 
environmental injustices will continue to prompt critiques of biomass as a carbon-mitigation 
strategy, despite its universal inclusion in RPSs.   
Livestock Manure in North Carolina’s Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio 
Standard 
 
Our last case focuses on the inclusion of a set-aside for residual livestock waste in North 
Carolina’s RPS. North Carolina is one of the country’s largest producers of both pork and 
poultry. It is the second largest pork producing state in the United States, with almost 12% of the 
country’s hog and pig inventory (USDA, 2016). According to the 2012 USDA Agricultural 
Census, the state’s hog and pig industry is worth $2.87 billion (USDA National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, 2012). Historically, US pork production was dominated by operations with 
fewer than 5,000 hogs and pigs. However, larger operations began to eclipse small-scale pork 
production in the mid-1990s. By 2014, operations with 5,000 or more animals generated 93% of 
annual pork production—an increase of over 340% over 1994 levels (USDA, 2016). This 
industrial-scale production accounts for almost 97% of North Carolina’s hog and pig sales ($2.78 
billion) (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2012). In sum, in North Carolina, “pig 
business is big business” (Maier, 2015). The state is also a lead producer of poultry. According 
to the North Carolina Poultry Federation, poultry is the state’s primary agricultural industry, 
making up almost 42% of North Carolina’s total farm income. North Carolina ranks second 
nationally in terms of total turkey production, and third nationally in terms of total poultry 
production (North Carolina Poultry Federation).  
 
 
4 In 2017, Senate Bill 339 was enacted to limit the amount of qualifying electricity generated at any single biomass 
facility that can be used to fulfill RPS 8% carve-out requirements to 20 MW for large utilities. 
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As the state’s livestock operations have become increasingly industrialized, animal waste 
generation has grown more concentrated. Together, the state’s hog and poultry operations 
produce more than 10 million gallons of fecal waste each year (Philpott, 2016). In industrial pork 
production, storage and treatment of waste is typically in wastewater "lagoons," which have 
become a significant environmental and health concern—including as a source of methane, a 
high potency greenhouse gas (Cole et al., 2000). Industrial poultry waste, generally stored in 
windrows, contains highly concentrated levels of arsenic (Christen, 2001). More regional adverse 
impacts from industrial-scale animal waste systems include water contamination with pathogens, 
pharmaceuticals, heavy metals, hormones, antibiotics, and pesticides (Burkholder et al., 2007), 
arsenic contamination in surface soils (Christen, 2001), and respiratory ailments in young people 
(Mirabelli et al., 2006). 
 
These hazards are exacerbated by the hurricanes that batter the state’s coastal regions. In North 
Carolina, industrial poultry and pork production is concentrated in the state’s eastern lowlands. 
These low-lying regions, whose residents are predominantly people of color (EWG; Wing and 
Johnston, 2014), are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes and their effects. Flooding has caused 
animal waste leech pools to overflow, hastening the spread of toxicants into surrounding areas. 
In 2018, for example, in the days following Hurricane Florence, data released by the North 
Carolina Department of Environmental Quality stated that at least 110 hog waste lagoons had 
already, or were imminently poised to release waste into waterways and surrounding areas 
(Pierre-Louis, 2018). The Environmental Working Group’s analysis in the days following 
Florence was even more dire. According to the group, there were “926 concentrated animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs) housing more than 3.8 million hogs and 578 poultry CAFOs 
holding an estimated 35 million fowl in areas where the National Weather Service said flooding 
was ‘occurring or imminent’” (EWG). With climate change, storms like Florence are predicted 
to intensify, increasing exposure risks for those living in the region.  
 
The mounting challenges posed by industrial-scale animal waste have been formative in shaping 
the state’s RPS. In 2007, North Carolina’s state legislature passed Senate Bill 3—the state’s first 
renewable energy and energy efficiency portfolio standard. This legislation included a carve-out 
for animal waste sources. It is the only state with an RPS that calls for an animal waste carve-out 
(Maier, 2015). The specific technologies through which energy is harnessed from animal waste 
to fulfill the carve-out requirement include direct combustion and methane gas capture for 
conversion to steam and electricity production (Holbrook, 2019; Walton, 2016). As reported in 
regional news outlets, the state’s poultry industry played a central role in lobbying for the poultry 
waste carve-out (Mitchell and Romoser, 2008). One of the bill’s main sponsors was state senator 
Charlie Albertson (D-Duplin), whose district hosts one of the highest concentrations of hog and 
poultry facilities in the state. According to the Winston-Salem Journal, Albertson “was the one 
who requested” the carve-outs for using poultry and swine waste to generate power because they 
“will help farmers with waste management” (Holbrook, 2019). Stephen De May, the president of 
Duke Energy North Carolina, which purchases renewable energy credits from animal waste 
conversion facilities, has also contributed that using animal waste as fuel “supports the important 
agriculture industry in North Carolina” (Brown, 2019). 
 
However, both environmental and energy justice advocates maintain that the animal waste carve-
outs perpetuate industrial animal production systems that are detrimental to human and 
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environmental health, and fundamentally question the argument that livestock waste is an energy 
source that should be incentivized alongside cleaner sources. According to the organization Food 
and Water Watch (2019), incentivizing animal waste combustion 
entrenches factory farms by creating a market for the huge volumes of manure they 
produce. Investing in the massive infrastructure needed to produce biogas wastes 
critical resources that should be used to shift us toward real renewable energy. 
 Likewise, Ayo Wilson of the NC Environmental Justice Network and NC WARN (two North 
Carolina-based environmental justice organizations), argues that animal waste-derived “biogas 
isn’t a solution as it stands right now because it fails to provide a complete remedy and threatens 
further entrenchment of an industry that consciously operates on white supremacy and 
destructive capitalism” (Food & Water Watch, 2019). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
How are we to interpret these controversial industrial-political bids for renewables classification, 
particularly toward developing industrial political ecology’s broader capacity to evaluate such 
projects? The brevity and selective nature of these examples means that their insights remain 
suggestive rather than conclusive. Nevertheless they clearly support our central argument that 
classifying and incentivizing particular energy sources as renewable is a political process, rooted 
in specific trajectories of industrial development. However, what kinds of political projects are 
we looking at? Some clear cross-cutting themes emerge here. 
 
First, furthering questioning of incumbency in renewable energy transition, the cases here 
highlight the ability of “dirty” and carbon-intensive sectors to make strategic use of renewable 
energy classification. Distinct from the resistance emerging against renewables and RPSs after 
the policies’ “fog of enactment” (Stokes, 2020) has been dispelled, we find other incumbent 
industries and regional political lobbies moving to appropriate the renewable label. One 
takeaway here is the room for rebranding available to carbon-intensive incumbents historically 
outside the formal energy sector (Oregon timber and North Carolina agro-industry). Another is 
the complexity of fossil industry encounters with renewables (Pennsylvania waste coal). With 
the 2004 RPS, Pennsylvania’s coal lobby most evidently seized an opportunity to extract 
concessions within a new RPS and more nascent renewables space in an era before booms in 
cheap natural gas and later renewables sharpened a more existential threat to the industry. This 
decline has lessened US coal’s potential for actual effective resistance to renewables, 
notwithstanding the experience’s traction in politics of racialized grievance (Rhys and Garner, 
2020). Echoing Glenna and Thomas (2010), it is nonetheless significant that the incumbent 
industry flexed its former muscle by attempting to rework definitions in its favor rather than 
pursue deeper intransigence. Today, that waste-based strategy offers lingering value-capture 
opportunities for Pennsylvania coal that are distinct from other politicized tail-end exactions like 
stranded cost payments extracted from taxpayers or utility ratepayers (Stokes, 2020). 
 
Second, such moves to exercise definitional power suggest obvious questions of opportunism 
and “greenwashing.” The cases demonstrate regionally powerful incumbent industries seizing 
(and governments creating) political opportunities—the crafting of RPS policies—as pathways to 
extend value-capture. For timber and livestock agriculture, these opportunities include new entry 
into the contemporary energy sector. In this space, these industries have the potential to exploit 
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the renewables sector’s openness to a raft of technologies, combined with the political 
opportunities of malleable RPS instruments and state governments’ institutional uncertainty with 
a rapidly evolving sector. Such opportunism might also encompass the discovery of 
unexpectedly cheap or profitable ways of resolving existing waste challenges, and thus shallower 
forms of firm or sectoral greenwashing. These moves reflect a history of quickly abandoned, 
token, and/or deceptive incumbent-industrial redirections into the renewables space—for 
example, US oil and industrial conglomerate acquisitions of solar start-ups in the 1970s (Jerneck, 
2017) or BP’s abortive and widely panned ‘Beyond Petroleum’ rebranding in the mid-2000s—
and a valid ongoing danger of such maneuverings. Certainly, diagnosing and combatting 
greenwashing should be central to industrial political ecology’s praxis, as with political ecology 
more generally. Industrial political ecology must continue to evaluate flaws in industries’ 
environmental knowledge claims and their failures to establish or meet reasonable standards of 
environmental performance. 
 
The greenwashing question is particularly applicable here because of the controversial 
materialities of these waste-to-energy resources, and corresponding weaknesses in climate 
change mitigation claims based upon them. RPSs are overtly supported for their contribution to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, yet processing and combusting all of the waste streams 
assembled here—from livestock wastes and waste coal to biomass from forest debris, milling 
wastes, or even whole trees—releases carbon dioxide and other other pollutants. Advocates 
argue that these processes usefully swap a high-potency greenhouse gas for a less damaging one 
(e.g., methane generated in manure lagoons for lower-potency carbon dioxide emitted in 
methane combustion), and that carbon dioxide emissions from biomass burning are rendered 
unproblematic in a ‘circular’ bioenergy economy (i.e. because as non-fossil fuels, this does not 
represent a net atmospheric addition). Yet many surrounding knowledge claims have provoked 
contestation. The carbon calculus of biomass resources in Oregon is particularly illustrative, as it 
highlights a science-policy contestation at the center of debates over controversial renewables. 
Advocates such as former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt centrally maintain that biomass is 
‘carbon-neutral’ (Science News Staff, 2018). This claim has been met with significant dissent by 
the scientific community, notably around the unconsidered full life-cycle emissions of forestry 
practices (Nian, 2016). Underlying all of this is the essential point that carbon accounting is a 
subjective practice. As Gifford (2020, page 5) notes,  
the measurement systems used to account for carbon involve complex interactions 
between political interests, scientific claims, and the material world... and the 
concepts used to determine measurement, like ‘baselines’  and ‘additionality,’ are 
deeply subjective and remain open to interpretation.  
This points to a necessary question of both carbon accounting in renewable energy transitions 
(i.e. how do RPSs contribute to decarbonization), and how wastes should or should not be 
valorized by policy tools such as renewable energy credits or biomass producer tax credits, as in 
Oregon.  
 
Third, these cases together underscore how particular material properties of wastes, and their 
framing, condition opportunities for different kinds of value capture within the renewable energy 
arena. As the North Carolina case demonstrates, framing methane-producing animal manure as a 
renewable energy source in an effort to capture value is explicitly reflected in statements by 
industries that have emerged at the intersection of livestock agro-industry and energy production. 
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As Al Tank, CEO of Revolution Energy Systems, which operates two manure-to-energy 
facilities in NC’s Duplin County, the heart of the state’s industrial hog production region, stated, 
“We should be talking about it in terms of ‘waste-to-value’ instead of ‘waste-to-energy’ 
projects… We are at the very beginning of ‘waste-to-value’ in the swine sector, and the North 
Carolina industry has the potential to be the undisputed leader in the U.S.” (Maier, 2015). Kelly 
Zering, an agricultural economist at NC State echoes this framing by suggesting that the “main 
appeal of biogas for the swine industry is the opportunity to turn a byproduct into an asset” 
(Ouzts, 2017). These two quotes demonstrate both dimensions of an intensive/extensive value 
dialectic (Walker, 2016). On the one hand, incumbent industries like pork producer Smithfield 
Foods, Inc. and Duke Energy are investing in new technologies to capture methane from 
decomposing feces for conversion to usable energy. On the other, hog production facilities once 
dependent on importing electricity are also now replacing or supplementing their own energy 
consumption with energy derived from pig waste, thereby reducing their operating costs (Maier, 
2015).  
 
Moreover, these dynamics resonate with Romero’s (2015, 2016) historical industrial analysis, 
which explores how re(e)valuation of industrial wastes can generate radically novel sectors, not 
simply reduce or selectively ‘mine’ (Knapp, 2016) waste streams to increase productivity and 
profitability in existing industries and production lines (a prevailing imaginary in mainstream 
industrial ecology). In Romero’s important case, fossil energy-industrial pollutants were 
transmuted into the feedstocks and material foundation of the new agro-chemicals industry. 
Walker (2016) conceptually underlines the importance of such qualitative deepenings in 
capitalist value-capture and accumulation, which have historically emerged from other 
unexpected places. The cases here situate such schemes anew within discussion of energy 
transitions and a prospective green industrial revolution. Building on these insights, we suggest 
that industrial political ecology must continue to explore the modes of institutional 
(re)organization and/or new sector emergence necessary for capturing value from waste, 
particularly under the guise of a green economy—a political economic process and a knowledge 
construction project.  
 
Fourth, and crucially, central to industrial political ecology’s praxis must be its racial, 
economic, and environmental justice commitments (Huber, 2017). To crystallize what we face in 
our cases: what was once an externality, often a burden on low-income folks and communities of 
color, is internalized as a source of value. Coal waste, woody debris, and pig and chicken shit 
were once devalued materials accumulating in space. Capital’s unrelenting search for surplus 
value has made them profitable via new modes of valorization including policy instruments, 
technological innovations, and labor. Even if waste-to-energy projects live up to their own 
defined criteria for “green” action (not a given) we must ask what waste problems and pathways 
of socio-ecological degradation these selective rebrandings ignore—and may thereby perpetuate 
and deepen. Indeed, the benefits of these efforts to capture value are unevenly borne. In North 
Carolina, for example, some of the cleanest technologies developed to capture methane from hog 
waste have been implemented in predominantly white regions of the state, whereas the majority 
of hog operations are located in communities of color (Ouzts, 2017). In parallel, the state’s intent 
to incentivize manure-to-energy through its RPS may have the effect of consolidating hog farms 
to take advantage of economies of scale (Longest, 2020; Ouzts, 2017). This coupled dynamic 
exacerbates both a pattern of farm loss among eastern North Carolina’s Black communities that 
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has persisted since the 1990s (Ladd and Edward, 2002), as well as a deeply-ingrained history of 
the state implementing racially discriminatory energy systems in its eastern region (Harrison, 
2016). In Pennsylvania, analysis conducted by Food & Water Watch has similarly identified that 
the state’s fossil-based power plants are disproportionately located near areas with a higher 
proportion of people of color. Whereas the state identifies approximately 25% of its census tracts 
as environmental justice communities, almost 50% of the census tracts within three miles of 
fossil-powered facilities are environmental justice tracts (Food & Water Watch, 2018). The 
harmful health effects of these facilities are most acute in areas surrounding coal-burning power 
plants (Krieger et al., 2016). And while the distributional effects of biomass are less obvious, the 
case of the siting and approval process for Seneca biomass facility in Oregon mirrors the trends 
discussed here, and more broadly of waste-to-energy incinerators across the country (Donahue, 
2018; Rootes and Leonard, 2009). The issue of unequal distribution of localized pollution in each 
case speaks to a central problem of environmental justice in controversial renewable energy 
geographies. 
 
In conclusion, we have argued here using the case of US RPSs and a set of “controversial” 
renewables that the politics of classification in the renewable energy sector demand ongoing 
scrutiny, particularly as they take shape and assume power within emerging green industrial 
policies. We have likewise maintained that these claims on renewable identity present under-
examined economic opportunities for a range of unlikely incumbent industries, including 
environmentally embattled ones. Similarly, they suggest pathways for governments that may 
wish to support such incumbent industries in processes of new value capture and/or rebranding 
via renewable classification. 
 
Evaluating governmental institutions as both sites (via processes like RPS-setting) and actors in 
these classification politics and evolving industrial-political geographies of energy transition, as 
we have begun to do through these three cases, is one important question for further research in 
industrial political ecology—not least because more established renewables like solar may 
deploy similar regionally distinct incentives and pose similar environmental/justice dilemmas. In 
the US context, more empirical and interpretive research is needed to explore why some state 
RPS policies now include specific industrial strategies and others do not, and to examine the 
range of different industries, kinds of industries, and industrial trajectories incentivized in such 
policies. The balance of industrial versus governmental power and agency in such politics is 
complex and contingent. Nonetheless, in evaluating questions of incumbency, industrial political 
ecology must develop situated principles for distinguishing state capture by opportunistic 
industries from more justice-minded governmental interventions to mitigate the costs of 
transition to a low-carbon economy. 
 
On this last point, industrial political ecological research must continue to clarify the limits of 
industrial rebranding and waste-to-value bids for rebranding. One the one hand, as renewables 
rise, it would be premature to interpret the mere presence of incumbent industries in these spaces 
as greenwashing. One of industrial political ecology’s contributions may be an analytical 
openness to the more transformative possibilities of a renewable energy economy, including 
unexpected places that recapturing and repurposing industrial wastes might lead. Similarly, 
material processes of utilizing ‘externalities’ do not necessarily entrench processes of 
dispossession and contamination: they may present possibilities for liberatory alternatives. On 
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the other hand, further industrial political ecological scholarship on energy must take seriously a 
central insight from theorists of racial capitalism: that the production of differential value—the 
process of rendering bodies and lives expendable or of lower value—is essential to capital 
accumulation (Melamed, 2015; Pulido, 2016b). Waste and wasting are more than a matter of 
simple externalities; they are internal to the creation of capitalist value. Therefore, research must 
scrutinize how environmental injustices sustain particular modes of valorization, and foreclose 
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